Review: Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
by Jimmy Carter
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review by Doug Woodward
SINCE JIMMY CARTER published his book Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, he has been accused of being anti-Semitic and anti-Israel; he has been accused of plagiarism; fellows from the Carter Center have resigned over the book; the leader of the Democratic House has rejected Carter's idea as not representative of the ex-President's Party; and a barrage of criticism and negative reviews have erupted as a result of the book.
With all of the criticism, a careful review of the book's content as well as a look at some of the major criticisms is warranted. Is the book itself so inflammatory? Or is all the fuss a result of delving too deeply into the sensitive topic of the Middle East conflict?
After a short introductory chapter that describes the importance and influence of the Middle East on global events, the majority of Palestine Peace Not Apartheid is a historical narrative that relies greatly on Carter's own experiences in the region. Carter concludes his book with summary of the major issues. This is preceded by a critical look at the situation in the West Bank that focuses on the “separation wall” or “security fence” carving up the West Bank. This penultimate chapter, titled “The Wall as a Prison” is where Carter derives the title of his book.
Carter starts his book by emphasizing that, “The Middle East is perhaps the most volatile region in the world, whose instability is a persistent threat to global peace” (11). He also acknowledges that “the issues are extremely complex” (12), “compromise is necessary from both sides” (15), and “strong support for peace talks must come from the Unites States” (16). As a basis for the book and for any potential solution, Carter identifies three basic premises: 1) Israel's right to exist and live in peace must be recognized by Palestinians and all other neighbors; 2) the killing of noncombatants cannot be condoned; and 3) Palestinians must live in peace and dignity in their own land.
Carter's Middle East Experience
The narrative begins with Carter's first visit to Israel in early 1973, when Israel was “filled with confidence and optimism” (22) following its victory in the 1967 war. Carter then jumps into a detailed account of Middle East events during his presidency, focusing on the Camp David Accords. His account of this landmark event is especially compelling for how often the negotiations nearly broke down; and how Carter, on several occasions, had to use all of his personal skills as he shuttled between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. A recurring theme for the book is how these accords emphasize “full autonomy” for the Palestinians (with the word full inserted at Begin's request), and how many aspects of this commitment faltered during future decades. Specifically, Carter laments, “Perhaps the most serious omission of the Camp David talks was the failure to clarify in writing Begin's verbal promise concerning the settlement freeze during subsequent peace talks” (50).
During a review of the major players in the region, Carter emphasizes Israel's thriving democracy: “The crucial issues are being debated much more vehemently there than anywhere in the outside world” (69). He also shares fascinating conversations with the late president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad; and the late king of Jordan, King Hussein; and recounts being the first person to use a single passport to cross the Allenby Bridge in 1983. As Carter walks us through the major events of the four U.S. presidents since 1980, he shares tales and compelling anecdotes (many from Palestinians) from his numerous visits to the region.
Apartheid
Only at the end of the book does Carter come to the title of his book and the provocative use of the word apartheid. In fact, the word apartheid is used only two times in the book in regard to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As he addressed the legal, moral, and practical problems of the separation barrier, he describes the unilateral construction of the wall as “imposing a system of partial withdrawal, encapsulation, and apartheid on the Muslim and Christian citizens of the occupied territories” (189). He is clear that this applies to the situation in Palestine and clearly is saying that the forced separation of two peoples is “not racism, but the acquisition of land” (190). The only other use of the word apartheid comes in Carter's honest assessment of future options.
Carter says only three possibilities exist. First, there could be one state, which runs contrary to many signed agreements, and would likely have a slight non-Jewish majority eventually. Second, there could be a system of apartheid with a separation of the races and a deprivation of basic human rights for Palestinians. Carter here quotes a prominent Israeli as to why, in the absence of a comprehensive solution, this is where we are heading and why it is not a good solution. The last option is the only viable and attractive option: a two-state solution based on mutually agreed compromises.
Criticism and Controversy
As a result of Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, Jimmy Carter has faced a barrage of withering criticism. Deborah Lipstadt, an Emory University professor, wrote a January 20, 2007, Washington Post opinion piece lambasting Carter. “A man who has done much good and wants to bring peace has not only failed to move the process forward but has given refuge to scoundrels.” His crime? Not emphasizing the Holocaust enough and not including it in his opening chronology of “Developments in the Middle East” (1). This from the president who in 1978 authorized the commission to establish The Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C.
Jimmy Carter also faced the resignation of 14 members, all Jewish, of his Board of Councilors (consisting of more than 200 members). The resignations were led by Dr. Kenneth W. Stein who wrote in his open letter of resignation on December 7, 2006, that “President Carter's book on the Middle East, a title too inflammatory to even print, is not based on unvarnished analyses; it is replete with factual errors, copied materials not cited, superficialities, glaring omissions, and simply invented segments.” Stein's detailed analysis—“My Problem with Jimmy Carter's Book,” printed in Daniel Pipes's Middle East Quarterly—doesn't back up many of these claims. Stein's list of grievances include Carter's personal tension with Menachem Begin (which Carter acknowledges), and discrepancies over a 1990 conversation with Hafez al-Assad where Carter's summary differs from Stein's notes on the encounter.
Carter was also denounced by members of his own party. “With all due respect, [Carter] does not speak for the Democratic Party on Israel,” Nancy Pelosi said in a written statement prior to the book's publication. In large part, it appears that Pelosi issued this statement to avoid criticism that she wasn't sufficiently pro-Israel, after dropping her sponsorship of a pro-Israel resolution during last summer's war in Lebanon when an amendment was rejected that called on both sides to avoid harming civilians.
Carter has also taken great flak for supposedly endorsing terrorism. In a January 23, 2007, address to Brandeis University, Carter apologized for a poorly worded phrase, and has asked his publisher to change it. The passage reads “It is imperative that the general Arab community and all significant Palestinian groups make it clear that they will end the suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism when international laws and the ultimate goals of the Roadmap for Peace are accepted by Israel” (213). Clearly the implication that terrorism may be warranted in the interim is unacceptable, but the context of the passage comes in Carter's final chapter where he is emphasizing that part of a comprehensive peace demands that “the security of Israel must be guaranteed” (207).
Certainly Carter could have been harder on the Palestinians to get their affairs in order, and his conversations with spokesmen from Hamas are largely recounted without commentary and without delving into conflicting statements. But, as Carter wrote in a January 18, 2007, Washington Post op-ed, “I am concerned that public discussion of my book, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, has diverted from the book's basic proposals: that peace talks be resumed after six years of delay and that the tragic persecution of Palestinians be ended.”
After reading Carter's book, one may find it sad to read about the continued increase of settlements, the near universal agreement on the general contours of a future settlement, and the political impasse that leads to so much death and destruction in the region. One hopes that Carter's book can spark a reasonable debate, because, as Carter laments, “There is no open debate in this country if it involves any criticism of the policies of the Israeli government.”
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